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WARGER V SHAUERS: TANNER 2.0 AND THE
NEED FOR A LESS RESTRICTIVE
INTERPRETATION OF FEDERAL RULE OF
EVIDENCE 606(B) AND ITS EXCEPTIONS
I. INTRODUCTION
This Note is a critique of the Supreme Court's recent decision in
Warger v. Shauersi and their continued enforcement of the logic in Tanner
v. United States with respect to Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b).' The
rule generally prevents a juror from testifying "about any statement made
or incident that occurred during the jury's deliberations; the effect of
anything on that juror's or another juror's vote; or any juror's mental
processes concerning the verdict or indictment." 4 Rule 606(b), and its three
exceptions, is Congress's attempt to formalize and create uniformity as to
when trial courts permit a juror to testify.5 This note evaluates over two
centuries of precedent and legal rhetoric that lead up to Rule 606(b), as
well as the subsequent interpretation
by the Supreme Court and the
6
findings.
and
logic
their
of
criticisms
II. HISTORY
For nearly as long as the United States has been a nation, the
practice of disallowing jurors from testifying about jury deliberations and
preserving verdicts has been a legally protected interest. 7 Less than a
decade after the U.S. declared its independence, England heard Vaise v.
Delaval,8 in which Lord Mansfield effectively argued that "a juror could
not offer testimony to impeach a verdict once it was rendered." 9 English

' 135 S. Ct. 521 (2014).
2 483 U.S. 107, 107 (1987).
3 See infra Part III (analyzing Tanner).
4 FED. R. Eve. 606(b).
5 Id.
6 See infra Parts III and IV (analyzing Rule 606(b) using precedent).
7 See Timothy C. Rank, FederalRule ofEvidence 606(b) and the Post-TrialReformation of
Civil Jury Verdicts, 76 MINN. L. REv. 1421, 1421-22 (1992) (detailing evolution of jury verdict
testimony and Rule 606(b)).
8 99 Eng. Rep. 944 (K.B. 1785).
9 See Rank, supra note 7, at 1425 (discussing American common law development of rule
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and American courts adopted the results of Vaise as the Mansfield Rule,
based primarily on the notion that a juror's testimony was not reliable if
they had committed wrongful conduct during deliberations.' 0
The
Mansfield Rule would remain substantively unchanged in the United States
for nearly a century until the Iowa Supreme Court deviated from the
general rule in Wright v. Illinois and Mississippi Telegraph Company."
The Wright Court was hesitant to deviate from the Mansfield Rule and
unwilling to open the jury to any party that wished to probe their methods,
but believed that it may be possible to allow a juror to testify on the
grounds in which the jury reached its verdict, without exposing or
invalidating the verdict itself 12 The court argued that:
the affidavit of a juror as to the independent fact that the verdict was
obtained by lot, or game of chance, or the like, is to receive his
testimony as to a fact, which, if not true, can be readily and certainly
606(b)); see Vaise, 99 Eng. Rep. at 944 (stating juror could not "allege his own turpitude").
10 See id. at 1425-26 (examining history of Rule 606(b)).

11 See 20 Iowa 195, 210 (1866) (determining whether or not jury could testify on "quotient
verdict"). After awarding damages to the plaintiff in a civil case, several jurors submitted an
affidavit that they reached the award by a quotient verdict: each juror wrote down how much
relief they believed the plaintiff should be awarded, the amounts were collected and added
together, and then divided by twelve to determine the award. Id. This practice was not unheard
of, but common law found it to be an invalid method of determining a verdict, and could be
grounds for a new trial. See id. at 202 (citing Forshee v. Abrams, Cook v. Sypher, and Manix v.
Maloney).
12 See id. at 209-13 (discussing circumstances under which judges may accept juror
affidavits). The court stated that:
While we do not feel entirely confident of its correctness, nor state it without
considerable hesitation, yet we are not without that assurance, which, under the
circumstances, justifies us in laying down the following as the true rule: That
affidavits of jurors may be received for the purpose of avoiding a verdict, to show
any matter occurring during the trial or in the jury room, which does not essentially
inhere in the verdict itself, as that a juror was improperly approached by a party, his
agent, or attorney; that witnesses or others conversed as to the facts or merits of the
cause, out of court and in the presence of jurors; that the verdict was determined by
aggregation and average or by lot, or game of chance or other artifice or improper
manner; but that such affidavit to avoid the verdict may not be received to show any
matter which does essentially inhere in the verdict itself, as that the juror did not
assent to the verdict; that he misunderstood the instructions of the court; the
statements of the witnesses or the pleadings in the case; that he was unduly
influenced by the statements or otherwise of his fellow jurors, or mistaken in his
calculations or judgment, or other matter resting alone in the juror's breast.
Id. at 210. The Court was not willing to allow free access to the jury or allow a single juror to
undermine the finality of a verdict. See id. at 210-11 (reasoning that allowing affidavits would
"unsettle verdicts and destroy their sanctity and conclusiveness.").
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disproved by his fellow jurors; and to hear such proof would have a
tendency to diminish such practices and to purify the jury room, by
rendering such improprieties capable and probable of exposure, and
consequently deterring jurors from resorting to them.' 3
Because of this, the court decided to permit the jurors' affidavits to

be used as grounds for a new trial.' 4
The decision in Wright grew into what is now known as the Iowa
Rule, and has since been adopted by multiple states.15 Only five years
later, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts used Woodward v.
Leavitt16 to create a second maj or detraction from the Mansfield Rule.17 In

Woodward, a motion for a new trial was filed after one juror disclosed that
another juror had already made up his mind prior to the trial, and
maintained that opinion when coming to a verdict.' 8 Other districts heavily
influenced Woodward by allowing juror affidavits "to disprove that a juror
had formed an opinion, or was subject to bias or prejudice, the affidavits of
the juror himself and his associates as to the part which he took in the
discussions in the jury room." 19 The court admitted portions of the juror's

13 See id. at 211 (distinguishing disprovable and non-disprovable juror affidavits).
14

See id. at 212-13 ("We are, therefore, of the opinion that the District Court erred in striking

from the files and refusing to consider the affidavits of the four jurors, that the verdict was
determined by each juror marking down such sum as he thought fit, and dividing the aggregate by
twelve and taking the quotient as their verdict, pursuant to a previous agreement to accept it as
such. These affidavits, uncontradicted, are sufficient to sustain the motion to set aside the verdict
and grant a new trial.").
15 See Rank, supra note 7, at 1428 (recounting impact of Wright case). "By 1969, the Iowa
rule had been adopted by twelve jurisdictions: Florida, Iowa, Kansas, Nebraska, New Jersey,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, Wisconsin, and the federal district
courts." Id. at 1428 n.39.
16 107 Mass. 453 (1871).
17 See id. at 460 (allowing juror testimony about another juror's preliminary conclusion
regarding case); Rank, supra note 7, at 1428 (discussing Woodward).
18 See Woodward, 107 Mass. at 459-60 (discussing juror's express opinion of case before
trial).
19 Id. at 470. Tenney v. Evans was one specifically cited case, which was heavily concerned
with biased or prejudicial jurors producing verdicts. See 13 N.H. 462, 463-64 (1843) ("The
affidavits of the foreman, and of one of the jurors, have been laid before us for the purpose of
removing any impression unfavorable to the verdict caused by the evidence offered to impeach it.
The decisions on the admissibility of the evidence of jurors, in relation to their verdict, are
contradictory."). In Tenney, the court reasoned that "[n]o one would willingly trust his life, or
even his property, to a jury composed of twelve persons, each of whom had made similar
declarations to those proved in this case." Id. at 466 (applying notably liberal approach to
probing potentially biased juries and allowing juror testimony). While aware of the need for
jurors to deliberate in private and with confidence, the Tenney court was also very fearful of the
impact a biased or incompetent jury had on a trial. Id. The court went into detail about possible
prejudiced or incompetent jurors:
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affidavit to determine the basis on which he formed his opinion about the
case, but omitted portions of the affidavit regarding what the jury discussed
during their deliberation.20 The court found that juror statements refuting
allegations a juror made about a defendant's guilt prior to trial are
admissible, establishing an exception to the Mansfield Rule for outside
influences, such as an initial prejudice for a verdict. 2 ' While state courts

were starting to create several major modifications to Mansfield, it would
take another two decades before
the Supreme Court finally decided a case
regarding juror testimony. 2 In Mattox v. United States, 3 jurors had to
decide the verdict in a criminal murder trial, in which Mattox was accused
of shooting John Mullen in December of 1889.24 Multiple jurors reported

that during deliberations, the bailiff read them a copy of local newspaper.25
The newspaper contained an article that concluded Mattox was guilty based
on the evidence.26 Woodward's ruling influenced the Court in that outside
influences were an exception to juror testimony about deliberations.
Ultimately, the Court found that the juror affidavits were competent and

But it is a part of the price we pay for this benefit, that weak-minded and
incompetent men will sometimes be selected; and no one can calculate in how short
a time a weak man, or one careless of his grave duties, may be prejudiced or
seduced into a wrong course. A greater evil could hardly befall society, than, with
institutions like our own, the loss of the public confidence in the entire impartiality
of juries; and the fearful consequences of such a result must ever be present to the
minds of all who are called upon to determine questions like the present.
Id. at 466-67.
20 See Woodward, 106 Mass. at 471 (holding, in part, juror affidavit properly admitted to
explain how the juror formed his opinion). The court found the latter portion of his affidavit
should have been excluded in that it was incompetent: "because it related to the private
deliberations of the jury, and had no tendency to disprove that he had previously expressed and
still entertained an opinion inconsistent with an impartial discharge of his duty." Id.
21 See id. (describing exception "The court in Woodward sought to maintain the integrity
of
the jury verdict by ensuring free and secret deliberations while pursuing allegations of extraneous
impropriety." Rank, supra note 7, at 1429.
22 See Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 150-51 (1892) (holding jurors may testify
about outside influence of reading newspaper before verdict); Rank, supra note 7, at 1429-30
(discussing Mattox).
23 146 U.S. 140 (1892).
24 See id. at 151.
25 Id. at 142-43.
26 See id. at 150-51 ("It is not open to reasonable doubt that the tendency of that article was
injurious to the defendant."). The Court was gravely concerned with how clearly prejudicial the
newspaper article was to the jury and the fact that it was read during their deliberation. Id. at 15051. The jury rendered its verdict against the defendant an hour later. Id. at 151. "Private
communications, possibly prejudicial, between jurors and third persons, or witnesses, or the
officer in charge, are absolutely forbidden, and invalidate the verdict, at least unless their
harmlessness is made to appear." Id. at 150.
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justified grounds for a new trial.27 The Supreme Court also upheld the
Iowa Rule, validating both State Supreme Court rules. 28 The holding in
Mattox would prevail until the Supreme Court heard McDonald v. Pless9
in 1915.3 o Similar to Wright, McDonald sought a new trial after jurors
stated that they determined the judgment amount by pooling together what
each juror thought the plaintiff should be awarded and then dividing the
sum by twelve. 3'
Rather than continuing with preceding case law,

however, the Court created a new method of determining whether a juror's
affidavit may be competent by balancing the parties' interest in a fair trial
and the jurors' interest in private deliberation:
[W]hen the affidavit of a juror, as to the misconduct of himself

or the other members of the jury, is made the basis of a motion
for a new trial, the court must choose between redressing the
injury of the private litigant and inflicting the public injury
which would result if jurors were permitted to testify as to what
had happened in the jury room.3 2
Upon performing this "balancing test," the McDonald Court found
that the greater concern was interest in preventing jurors from harassment
and having private deliberations.3 3 The Court justified their decision to

27
28
29
30

See id.
at 149 (distinguishing Woodward).
See id.(affirming rationale of Iowa Rule).
238 U.S. 264 (1915).
See id. at 264 (preventing jury from being harassed is greater interest than verdict inquiry:

balancing test); Rank, supra note 7, at 1430 ("Several years later, the Supreme Court again
considered the admissibility of juror testimony, this time in a civil case concerning a jury's use of
a quotient verdict."); MICHAEL H.GRAHAM, 4 HANDBOOK OF FED. EVID. § 606:2 (7th ed. 2015)
(outlining development and rationale of Rule 606(b)).
31 See McDonald, 238 U.S. at 265 (discussing jury deliberations).
32 Id. at 267.
33 See id.at 267-68 (discussing conflicting considerations of trial fairness and juror privacy).
The Justices were highly concerned about opening the flood gates and exposing every jury to
scrutiny and analysis for every verdict against a party's interest:
Jurors would be harassed and beset by the defeated party in an effort to secure from
them evidence of facts which might establish misconduct sufficient to set aside a
verdict, If evidence thus secured could be thus used, the result would be to make
what was intended to be a private deliberation, the constant subject of public
investigation to the destruction of all frankness and freedom of discussion and
conference.
Id.at 267-68; GRAHAM, supra note 30, at § 606:2. The court further asserted its concern, saying:
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exclude the testimony with three enumerated reasons. 34
First, the court reasoned that "admitting the testimony encourages
post-trial jury harassment."35 Second, they believed that admitting the
testimony may discourage "free and frank discussions within the jury room,
because jurors may fear that their discussions would become public
knowledge. 36 Third, the court determined that "admitting the testimony
interferes with the finality of litigation
by encouraging unsuccessful
' 37
litigants to tamper with jury verdicts.

The Court's new adoption and application of a balancing test in
McDonald caused considerable confusion and inconsistencies amongst the
different jurisdictions. 38 To establish more clarity and consistency,
Congress took action in 1974 to create Federal Rule of Evidence 606. 39
Rule 606(b)(1) states that:

For, while it may often exclude the only possible evidence of misconduct, a change
in the rule "would open the door to the most pernicious arts and tampering with
jurors." "The practice would be replete with dangerous consequences." "It would
lead to the grossest fraud and abuse" and "no verdict would be safe."
McDonald, 238 U.S. at 268 (quoting Cluggage v. Swan, 4 Binn. 155 (PA 1811); Straker v.
Graham, 4 Mees. & W. 721 (Eng. 1839).
34 See Rank, supra note 7, at 1430 ("Using this balancing test,
the Court found three
overriding reasons to exclude the testimony.").
35 Rank, supra note 7, at 1430; see McDonald, 238 U.S. at 257-68.
36 Rank, supra note 7, at 1430; see McDonald, 238 U.S. at 257-68.
37 Rank, supra note 7, at 1430; see McDonald, 238 U.S. at 257-68 (expressing concern with
opening jury deliberations to scrutiny).
38 See Rank, supra note 7, at 1431 (discussing Rule 606(b) conception and birth). While the
Court concluded in saying that "such testimony of the juror could not be excluded without
'violating the plainest principles ofjustice[,]' [t]his might occur in the gravest and most important
cases..., it failed to elaborate upon what it meant by "gravest and most important" or to ask a
standard from which other courts could determine for themselves. See McDonald, 238 U.S. at
269. This led to every jurisdiction implementing different standards and applications for the
same rule. See Susan Crump, Jury Misconduct, Jury Interviews, and the Federal Rules of
Evidence: Is the Broad Exclusionary Principalof Rule 606(b) Justified?, 66 N.C. L. REv. 509,
519 (1988) (discussing issues American common law created issues on juror testimony about
deliberations).
In a sense, it is not surprising that courts even in the same jurisdiction reached
inconsistent results and emphasized different policy concerns in doing so. When the
Mansfield Rule was divorced from its initial justification, numerous policies arose
to allow the Rule to retain its viability. These policies were developed piecemeal,
were at times contradictory, and frequently were inartfully balanced.
Id.
39 See Edward T. Swaine, Note, Pre-Deliberations Juror Misconduct, Evidential
Incompetence, andJuror Responsibility, 98 YALE L.J. 187, 188-89 (1988) (showing development
of 606(b) and better alternatives available to courts).
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During an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a
juror may not testify about any statement made or incident that
occurred during the jury's deliberations; the effect of anything

on that juror's or another juror's vote; or any juror's mental
processes concerning the verdict or indictment. The court may

not receive a juror's affidavit or evidence of a juror's statement
on these matters.40
606(b)(2) allows three exceptions to the overall prohibition ofjuror
testimony: "(A) extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought
to the jury's attention; (B) an outside influence was improperly brought to

bear on any juror; or (C) a mistake was made in entering the verdict on the
verdict form." 4' While Rule 606(b) created a more uniform application of
juror testimony, it has been riddled with varying interpretations of its
language and scope, leading to a nationally inconsistent application.42 The
Rule has gone through several textual and superficial revisions since 1974,
but Rule 606(b) has remained substantively unchanged for nearly half a
century.43

40 FED. R. EVID. 606(b)(1).
41 See id. at (b)(2) (listing three exceptions a juror may testify about).
42

See Swaine, supra note 39, at 188-92 ("Instead, discussion focuses on alternative means of

securing evidence of misconduct (and abiding by Rule 606(b)), to the text of the note more
effective ways of protecting the jury (and slighting Rule 606(b)), to the text of the note and
subject-matter exceptions necessary to make the general exclusion of testimony under 606(b)
tolerable."). "The jurisprudence of Rule 606(b) has been waging a losing war against juror
misconduct." Id.at 206.
43 See FED. R. EviD. 606 advisory committee's note ("The mental operations and emotional
reactions of jurors in arriving at a given result would, if allowed as a subject of inquiry, place
every verdict at the mercy of jurors and invite tampering and harassment."). In 2006, Congress
amended Rule 606 to include an exception for a juror to testify if the verdict reported was the
result of a mistake in entering the verdict on the verdict form.Id. See FED. R. EVID. 606 advisory
committee's note to 2006 amendment ("Rule 606(b) has been amended to provide that juror
testimony may be used to prove that the verdict reported was the result of a mistake in entering
the verdict on the verdict form."). It was expressly added to address a split amongst the circuits
and varied application. See generally Plummer v. Springfield Tenn. Ry. Co., 5 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir.
1993) ("A number of circuits hold, and we agree, that juror testimony regarding an alleged
clerical error, such as announcing a verdict different than that agreed upon, does not challenge the
validity of the verdict or the deliberation of mental processes, and therefore is not subject to Rule
606(b)."); Karl v. Burlington Northern R. Co., 880 F.2d 68, 74-75 (8th Cir. 1989) (supporting its
application of Rule 606(b)). However, this new exception was limited to instances "where the
jury foreperson wrote down, in response to an interrogatory, a number different from that agreed
upon by the jury, or mistakenly stated that the defendant was 'guilty' when the jury had actually
agreed that the defendant was not guilty." Robles v. Exxon Corp., 862 F.2d 1201, 1208 (5th Cir.
1989).
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III. ANALYSIS

While there has been virtually no substantive change to Rule
606(b) for decades, there remain considerable concerns of its efficacy and
critiques of its current applications.44 Many believe that 606(b) should be
less restrictive in allowing parties to examine a jury's decision because
juries are often not competent when rendering their verdict.45 While there
are dozens, if not hundreds, of procedures set in place to limit the types of
evidence parties present to the jury and dictating the manner the evidence
should be presented, it is currently extremely difficult to determine if any
of a court's precautions were actually adopted by the jury upon making
their verdict or if the verdicts are arbitrary. 46 Timothy Rank eloquently
described the reliance on jurors:
An irony of the jury system in the United States is that jurors are
considered at the same time omniscient and incompetent. They
are deemed incapable of weighing the difference between
"admissible" and "inadmissible" evidence, but considered
sufficiently responsible and autonomous to mete out justice with
little review of the rationale behind their decisions.47
Jurors do not necessarily ignore their instructors, but cases often
deal with complex legal matters well beyond the realm of a layperson's
common experience, making juries often unqualified to make an informed
verdict. 48 The Supreme Court addressed many of these complaints and
44 See Rank, supra note 7, at 1421-27 (discussing concerns of overly relying on jurors and

suggestion of greater oversight); William W. Schwarzer, Reforming Jury Trials, 132 F.R.D. 575,
576-77 (1991) (suggesting ways to improve jury efficacy and transparency, and recommending
reform in regards to 606(b)); Benjamin T. Huebner, Beyond Tanner: An Alternative Framework
for PostverdictJuror Testimony, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1469, 1484 (2006) (suggesting alternatives
to preserve juror privacy); Crump, supra note 38, at 510 (criticizing Tanner and 606(b) for lack of
clarity and direction).
45 See Rank, supra note 7, at 1421 (outlining issues such as too much faith in jurors and
concerns of limited oversight).
46 See id. at 1421-23 (criticizing jury system in United States trial system).
41 Id. at 1421-22.
48 See Schwarzer, supra note 44, at 576 (providing insight and suggestions into fixing current
jury system, which often uses uninformed jurors).
We have to guard against the creation of a new school of legal thinking: Law and
Nostalgia. And we must escape the shackles of habit and tradition to make more
effective use of juries. A genuine commitment to jury trials must therefore be
accompanied by openness to enlightened change if the new demands of complex
litigation are to be accommodated.
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inconsistencies with their interpretation of Rule 606(b) when they heard
Tanner v. United States.49
A. Tanner
Anthony R. Tanner was charged with and convicted of committing
50
various acts of mail fraud and conspiring to defraud the United States.
Before sentencing, it was revealed to Tanner and his attorney that several
of the jurors had been drinking throughout the trial, and often fell asleep by
the afternoon. 5' The district court judge denied his motion for a new trial,
finding that the only source of evidence to validate Tanner's claims was
juror testimony, which was barred under Rule 606(b).52 Upon appeal, other
jurors came forward describing multiple instances in which jurors drank to
the point of inebriation, regularly smoked marijuana, and ingested cocaine
throughout the trial and deliberations. 53 Despite the second account, the
appellate court also denied the motion for a new trial, as they were not
persuaded by Tanner's argument that alcohol and drugs should count as
"outside influences" in regards to the exception for 606(b).54
In her opinion, Justice O'Connor relied heavily on precedent,
notably McDonald v. Pless and Mattox v. United States, in arguing the
Court's extreme trepidation in expanding any possibility of allowing a juror
to testify about jury deliberations). The Supreme Court's fear of halting

Id. at 596.

49 See Tanner v. United states, 483 U.S. 107, 125 (1987) (holding juror intoxication is not an
"outside influence" under Rule 606(b)).
50 See id. at 108 (discussing facts of case).

" Id. at 107.
52 See id. at 113 (discussing procedural history of the case). Tanner's attorney received a
phone call from Vera Absul, one of the jurors, to inform him that many of the jurors were
drinking throughout the trial and deliberations, and were overall inattentive. Id. The only other
form of evidence supporting Absul's claim was the observation by Tanner's attorneythat several
of the jurors were "in a sort of giggly mood" at parts of the trial. Id. Tanner's attorney, however,
was faulted for not addressing this during the trial and the judge concluded that there was lack of
sufficient grounds to warrant a motion for a new trial. Id. at 114-15.
" See id. at 115-16 (discussing facts of trial). Juror Daniel Hardy approached Tanner's
attorney at his home to elaborate on the extent of the jurors' debauchery. Id. at 116. Upon giving
his account to private investigators, hired by counsel, he described that he "felt like ... the jury

was onone bigparty." Id. at 115.
54

See Tanner, 483 U.S. at 115-16 (discussing lower court's findings).

5 See id. at 116-2 1. Justice O'Conner wrote:

[L]et it once be established that verdicts solemnly made and publicly returned into
court can be attacked and set aside on the testimony of those who took part in their

publication and all verdicts could be, and many would be, followed by an inquiry in
the hope of discovering something which might invalidate the finding. Jurors would
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the judicial process and the public losing faith in jury trials led them to
ultimately
language of the Rule cannot easily be stretched to
thi find
cove
" that. "the ,,16
cover this circumstance.
Despite their impact and impropriety, "drugs or
alcohol voluntarily ingested by a juror seems no more an
5 7 'outside
influence' than a virus, poorly prepared food, or a lack of sleep.
The decision in Tanner, however, was heavily criticized, even by
several members of the Supreme Court.5" In his dissent, Justice Marshall
expressed his deep concern for how inattentive and intoxicated the jurors
were, and quoted Justice O'Connor's opinion in a previous case to express
that there should be some degree of oversight, because:
A hearing permits counsel to probe the juror's memory, his reasons
for acting as he did, and his understanding of the consequences of his
actions. A hearing also permits the trial judge to observe the juror's
demeanor under cross-examination and to evaluate his answers in light of
the particular circumstances of the case.59
Marshall further argues that 606(b) should not prevent the jurors
from testifying about alcohol and drug consumption because it would not
reveal what was discussed during their deliberations, merely what
happened before and after.60
The dissent criticized the Court's

be harassed and beset by the defeated party in an effort to secure from them
evidence of facts which might establish misconduct sufficient to set aside a verdict.
If evidence thus secured could be thus used, the result would be to make what was
intended to be a private deliberation, the constant subject of public investigation to
the destruction of all frankness and freedom of discussion and conference.
Id. at 119-20 (quoting McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 267-68 (1915)).
56 See id. at 122-25 (holding juror intoxication is not an "outside influence").
7 Id. at 122.

See id. at 134-42 (presenting dissenting opinions). Justices Brennan Blackmun, and
Stevens joined Justice Marshall, who dissented in part and concurred in part with the majority's
decision. Id.
59 Tanner, 483 U.S. at 135 (quoting Smithy. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 222 (1982) (O'Connor,
J., concurring)).
60 See id. at 13 8-39 (advocating for juror alcohol consumption testimony). Justice Marshall
elaborated his argument by explaining that:
58

By its terms . . . Rule 606(b) renders jurors incompetent to testify only as to three
subjects: (i) any "matter or statement" occurring during deliberations; (ii) the
"effect" of anything upon the "mind or emotions" of any juror as it relates to his or
her "assent to or dissent from the verdict"; and (iii) the "mental processes" of the
juror in connection with his "assent to or dissent from the verdict." Even as to
matters involving deliberations, the bar is not absolute.
Id. at 138; see FED. R. EVID. 606 (discussing prohibited testimony).
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classification of drugs and alcohol to not be an outside influence in regards
to 606(b), and did not subscribe to the fear that this would expand the
definition of "outside influence" to include more trivial matters, such as 61a
juror suffering from sleep deprivation or common sicknesses.
Furthermore, the dissenting opinion criticized the Court's trepidation
about impacting the juror system, arguing that:

[p]etitioners are not asking for a perfect jury. They are seeking to
determine whether the jury that heard their case behaved in a
manner consonant with the minimum requirements of the Sixth

Amendment. If we deny them this opportunity, the jury system
may survive, but the constitutional guarantee on which it is
based will become meaningless.6 2
Tanner was the broadest interpretation of Rule 606(b) and by far
the most restrictive allowance of juror testimony the Supreme Court had
yet issued, which quickly restricted the lower courts and severely limited
opportunities for jurors to testify; if alcohol and drugs were not considered
outside influences, than what could possibly be considered an internal
influence? 63 Almost immediately after Tanner, lower courts felt restricted
by their interpretation of 606(b) and, when possible, tried to make
distinctions to permit more digression by the trial judge.64 While it may

This was one of the broader liberties that the Court took with its opinion in Tanner, not only
expanding the subject matter covered under 606(b) (by not including alcohol and drugs as an
"outside influence"), but also the scope in which it was discussed. See Tanner, 483 U.S. at
138-39 (describing areas jurors can testify about, like consuming alcohol). The dissent
holds, however, that allowing jurors to testify about what other juror's consumed before
deliberations is not substantively "what was intended to be a private deliberation', and
should ultimately not be included under the scope of 606(b). Id. at 140-41 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting); see McDonald, 238 U.S. at 267-68 (discussing history and application of
606(b)).
61

Tanner, 483 U.S. at 141. It is a fear that is not rationalized by any data or precedent, and

greatly overlooks the courts' ability to use discretion, which the dissent believes would simply be
the familiar practice of line-drawing. See id.("Courts are asked to make these sorts of
distinctions in numerous contexts; I have no doubt they would be capable of differentiating
between the intoxicants involved in this case and minor indispositions not affecting juror
competency.").
62 Id. at 142.
63 See supra text accompanying notes 56-63 (criticizing Court's definition of "outside
influence").
64 See Dobbs v. Zant, 720 F. Supp. 1566, 1574 (N.D. Ga. 1989), aff'd, 963 F.2d 1403 (11th
Cir. 1991), rev'd, 506 U.S. 357 (1993) (making distinction between racial prejudice and
intoxication, particularly in observability); United States v. Villar, 586 F.3d 76, 87 (1st Cir. 2009)
("[u]sing this framework, most courts have concluded that juror testimony about race-related

2016]

TANNER 2.0

have only exclusively dealt with juror intoxication, Tanner's extreme
reluctance to permit juror's to testify about jury deliberations and the
Court's broad interpretation of what constitutes "outside influences" had an
echoing effect in many of the lower courts, who felt compelled that their
rationale could be applied to other matters as well. 65 Ultimately, the
Supreme Court managed to only further divide the lower courts in regards
to Rule 606(b), as many tried to have their rationale apply strictly to cases
in which a juror is going to testify about alcohol and drug consumption
during the trial, while others tried to liberally apply the logic in Tanner to
bar a gambit of claims, resulting in a lack of uniformity and clarity.66 This
lack of clarity and diminishment of Rule 606(b) exceptions has led to
multiple criticisms of the rationale in Tanner, most notably the Court's

statements made by deliberating jurors does not fall within either the 'extraneous prejudicial
information' or the 'outside influence' exceptions of Rule 606(b), but does fall squarely within
Rule 606(b)'s prohibition of post-verdict juror testimony."); Mejias v. Filion, No. 13 Civ. 8362
PKC GWG, 2014 WL 2573656, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. May 8, 2014) report and recommendation
adopted,No. 13 Civ. 8362 PKC GWG, 2014 WL 3728217 (S.D.N.Y. July 24, 2014) (disagreeing
with expansion in Tanner to juror's deliberating prior to trial, keeping strict interpretation); State
v. Cherry, 341 Ark. 924, 933 (2000) (finding Tanner did not apply to testimony about juror
deliberations prior to trial). In Cherry, the court went one step further and, contrary to Tanner,
found that jurors could discuss improper conduct prior to the trial without breaching the
confidentiality of the juror deliberations, and that it was essential they do so because:
As egregious as such conduct may have been, we cannot say that standing alone, it
would have been enough to support a finding of prejudice. However, when this
conduct is considered in light of the testimony that some jurors prematurely formed
a conclusion about defendant's guilt and then discussed those conclusions with
other jurors, it does support a finding of prejudice. In light of the foregoing, we
cannot say the trial court manifestly abused its discretion in granting Cherry a new
trial.
Cherry, 341 Ark. at 933.
65

See Cherry, 341 Ark. at 928-29 (relying heavily on Tanner to prevent juror deliberation on

pre-trial discussions of jurors). "The[Tanner] Court stated that under the federal rules of evidence
a verdict may not be impeached by jury testimony on matters involving jury deliberations." Id.
66 See Huebner, supra note 44, at 1487-90 (discussing application of Tanner in different
states). Many cases take particular notice when dealing with a racial bias and pre-trial evidence
of prejudice, which has been a complaint in regards to 606(b). Id. at 1489-90 (citing 606(b) in the
context of racial bias when accepting affidavits). In regards to the courts' split on whether racism
is an "outside influence" in 606(b), one court said:
In our view, the four protections relied on by the Tanner Court do not provide
adequate safeguards in the context of racially and ethnically biased comments made
during deliberations. While individual pre-trial voir dire of the jurors can help to
disclose prejudice, it has shortcomings because some jurors may be reluctant to
admit racial bias.
Villar, 586 F.3d at 87.
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fears and slippery-slope logic not being based on any amicus briefs or
representative data, but rather a generalized feeling and belief.67 Benjamin
Huebner summarized the Tanner decisions, explaining that Tanner:
... excluded testimony on juror intoxication, despite the fact that
juror testimony on this topic was no more likely to impact the
privacy of deliberations, impair the finality of verdicts, or cause
more juror harassment than comparable juror testimony on
admissible subjects, such as a juror bringing a newspaper into
the jury room.6 8

B. Doubling-Down on Tanner
Despite the multitude of criticisms, concerns, and fallacies
associated with the decision in Tanner, the Supreme Court recently assured
its validity in their opinion of Warger v. Shauers.69 In a 9-0 decision, the
Supreme Court ruled to not only rely on the decision of Tanner, but to use
its logic to restrict the exceptions to Rule 606(b) even further. 70 Gregory
Warger sued Randy Shauers in federal court after a motor vehicle accident
resulted in Warger losing his left leg. 7'
He alleged that Shauers'
negligence was the cause of the accident, and wished to recover for
property damage, loss of enjoyment of life, permanent disability, present
and future medical expenses, and prejudgment interest. 72 After the jury
ruled in favor of Shauers, one of the jurors approached Warger to express
her concern with a statement made by Regina Whipple, the jury
forewoman, who, during deliberations, discussed "'a motor vehicle
collision in which her daughter was at fault for the collision and a man
died,' and had 'related that if her daughter had been sued, it would have

67

See Huebner, supra note 44, at 1484 (offering different approach to preserving juror

privacy by pulling away from ruling in Tanner).
68 See id. (offering different approach to preserving juror privacy by pulling away from
ruling in Tanner). Despite Justice O'Connor's fears that it is not clear that "the jury system could
survive such efforts" to permit juror testimony about pre-trial discussions, and that an
investigation into the validity of a verdict would result in the entire jury system being
"undermined by a barrage of postverdict scrutiny of juror conduct", she never offers specific
evidence as to why or how prevalent these results would be. See Tanner, 483 U.S. at 120-21.
69 135 S. Ct. 521 (2014).
70 See id. at 525-26 ("We hold that Rule 606(b) applies to juror testimony during a
proceeding in which a party seeks to secure a new trial on the ground that a juror lied during voir
dire.").
71 Id. at 524.
72

id.
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ruined her life.' 73 This comment was made despite a lengthy, probative
voir dire, where Whipple, and every other prospective juror, was
specifically asked "whether [she] would be unable to award damages for
pain and suffering or for future medical expenses, or whether [she] thought,
74
'I don't think I could be a fair and impartial juror on this kind of case."'
Upon hearing this, Warger moved for a new trial, relying on the
precedent of McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood,75 which held
that:
[T]o... obtain a new trial in such a situation, a party must first
demonstrate that a juror failed to answer honestly a material
question on voir dire, and then further show that a correct
response would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for
cause. The motives for concealing information may vary, but
only those reasons that affect a juror's impartiality can truly be
said to affect the fairness of a trial.76
Both the district court and Eighth Circuit, however, did not grant
Warger a new trial, finding that Rule 606(b)'s barred "any statement made
or incident that occurred during the jury's deliberations" which ruled over
the matter, and that none of the exceptions in 606(b)(2) for "(A) extraneous
prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention; (B)
an outside influence was improperly brought to bear on any juror; or (C) 77
a
mistake was made in entering the verdict on the verdict form" applied.
73

id.

74 Shauers, 135 S. Ct. at 524.
75 464 U.S. 548 (1984).
76 See id. at 556 (reversing Appellate Court's decision granting defendant new trial after
revealing juror's deception during voir dire). Justice Rehnquist commented on behalf of the
majority of the Court that he did not want to overturn a three week trial because one of the jurors
did not disclose his son was injured by a truck tire explosion when asked:

Now, how many of you have yourself or any members of your immediate family
sustained any severe injury, not necessarily as severe as Billy, but sustained any
injuries whether it was an accident at home, or on the farm or at work that resulted
in any disability or prolonged pain and suffering, that is you or any members of
your immediate family?
Id. at 550. While in this case, Justice Rehnquist did not believe the omission was sufficient to
grant the defendant a new trial, he did comment that "respondents are not entitled to a new trial
unless the juror's failure to disclose denied respondents their right to an impartial jury." Id. at
549.
77 See FED. R. EvD. 606 (enumerating exceptions); Shauers, 135 S.Ct. at 525 (recounting
procedural history).
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The Eighth Circuit elaborated that the exception to 606(b)(2)(A) did not
apply because "[j]urors' personal experiences do not constitute extraneous
information; it is8 unavoidable they will bring such innate experiences into
7
the jury room."
The Supreme Court granted certiorari: not to refute or challenge
these findings, as was the hope of this Note, but rather to affirm them.79
The Court's logic mirrored their argument in Tanner, by first detailing the
evolution of preventing juror testimony from Lord Mansfield to the lower
courts' schism of the Iowa Rule and the more restrictive federal
approaches.80 On behalf of the entire Court, Justice Sotomayor's opinion
relied on the legislative history of Rule 606(b) to infer Congress's
preference for stricter guidelines when permitting juror testimony; by not
only the words used in the rule, but also the words not used.8 ' Justice
Sotomayor stated:
Congress rejected a prior version of the Rule that, in accordance
with the Iowa approach, would have prohibited juror testimony
only as to the 'effect of anything upon ... [any] juror's mind or
emotions ... or concerning his mental processes.82
The Court then interprets this omission of language to mean
Congress "specifically understood, considered, and rejected" the House's
proposed language.83 This interpretation is extreme, especially considering
that the Conference's note to subdivision (b) expressly states that "[t]he
Senate bill does provide, however, that a juror may testify on the question
whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the
jury's attention and on the question whether any outside influence was
improperly brought to bear on any juror", and was ultimately adopted to
form Rule 606(b).84 While not expressly permitting the use of juror
78 Shauers, 135 S. Ct. at 525 (quotingWargerv. Shauers, 721 F.3d 606, 611 (8thCir. 2013)).
79

id.

o See id. at 525-27 (discussing genesis and development of Rule 606(b)).
81 See id. at 527 (rejecting version of rule permitting introducing "evidence of deliberations

to show dishonesty during voir dire").
82 See id. (quoting Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference
of the United States, Revised Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts
and Magistrates, 51 F.R.D. 315, 387 (1971)) (rejecting version of rule permitting introducing
"evidence of deliberations to show dishonesty during voir dire"); Schwarzer, supra note 44, at
576 (providing insight and suggestions into fixing current jury system, which often uses
uninformed jurors); supra text accompanying notes 6-9 (deviating from Mansfield Rule).
83 See Shauers, 135 S. Ct. at 527 (discussing legislative history of Rule 606(b)).
84 FED. R. EvD. 606; see Shauers, 135 S. Ct. at 528 (discussing legislative history of Rule
606(b)).
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testimony for statements made during voir dire, the final adopted language
of Rule 606(b) does not expressly forbid it, and the court may deem
Whipple's statement either an "outside influence," or perhaps more
appropriately, "extraneous prejudicial information," which multiple lower
courts have done.85
Warger argued that he merely wished to allow testimony regarding
what was said during voir dire, not the deliberations themselves or the
reasoning behind the verdict, since McDonough simply requires a false
statement be made prior to juror deliberations: "inquiry begins and ends
with what happened during voir dire ."6 The Court, however, found this to
be an illegitimate way to circumvent 606(b)(1), arguing that:
It simply applies "[d]uring an inquiry into the validity of the
verdict"-that is, during a proceeding in which the verdict may be rendered
invalid. Whether or not a juror's alleged misconduct during voir dire had a
direct effect on the jury's verdict, the motion for a new trial requires a court
to determine whether the verdict can stand.87
Continuing with their traditional interpretation of Rule 606(b), the
Court rejected Warger's constitutional concerns with Rule 606(b).88 Justice
Sotomayor acknowledged the Constitution's requirement of access to an
impartial jury,89 but was not persuaded, firmly holding "any claim that Rule
606(b) is unconstitutional in circumstances such as these is foreclosed by
our decision in Tanner," and relying on the same logic that:
A party's right to an impartial jury remains protected despite
Rule 606(b)'s removal of one means of ensuring that jurors are
unbiased. Even if jurors lie in voir dire in a way that conceals
bias, juror impartiality is adequately assured by the parties'
ability to bring to the court's attention any evidence of bias
before the verdict is rendered, and to employ nonjuror evidence
85

See FED. R. EVID. 606(b) (illustrating rule); see also United States v. Henley, 238 F.3d

1111, 1120 (9th Cir. 2001) ("Racial prejudice is plainly a mental bias that is unrelated to any

specific issue that a juror in a criminal case may legitimately be called upon to determine. It
would seem, therefore, to be consistent with the text of the rule, as well as with the broad goal of
eliminating racial prejudice from the judicial system, to hold that evidence of racial bias is
generally not subject to Rule 606(b)'s's prohibitions against juror testimony.").
86 See Shauers, 135 S.Ct. at 528 (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 19 20, Warger v. Shauers,
135 S. Ct 521 (2014) (No. 13-517)) (relying onMcDonough).
87 Id.(quoting FED. R. EVID. 606).
88 See id.(reasoning that voire dire is essential to protecting defendant's right to impartial
jury).
89 See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362 (1966) (discussing media impact on jury);
Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946) (finding juror competence to be
individual matter, not class or group).
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even after the verdict is rendered. 90
The Supreme Court still heavily relied on the belief of preventive
measures to forestall virtually all juror testimony regarding significant juror
bias, despite the considerable concerns and contradictions of that logic. 9'
The Justices' fear of permitting juror testimony continued to persist even
when Warger tried to argue that several of the exceptions in 606(b) apply;
but in addition to finding that 606(b) does not apply to voir dire statements
and that it is constitutional, the Court further reasoned that no other
exception would permit the testimony either. 92 Particularly, the Court was
not willing to find that Warger's affidavit pertained to "extraneous
prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention"
under Rule 606(b)(2)(A). 93 The Court greatly relied on their findings in
Tanner, again, and concluded that "extraneous" means anything from a
"source 'external' to the jury", and the forewoman's statements are
"internal" since all jurors bring in their life experiences and it provided no
specific knowledge of either party in the case.9 4
Shauers concluded with the Supreme Court re-affirming nearly
every doctrine they held in Tanner and refusing to allow a juror to testify,
despite acknowledging Warger's grounds for a new trial and ignoring
nearly three decades of criticisms, deviations, and contradictions of their
reasoning. 95
In Shauers, the Court ignored many of the plaintiffs
arguments by saying that Tanner already ruled on the matter: "Moreover,
this Court's Tanner decision forecloses any claim that Rule 606(b) is
unconstitutional. Similar to the right at issue in that case, Warger's right to
an impartial
jury
despite Rule 606(b)'s removal of one
mean
nsurng
of remains
" protected
, •
,,96
means of ensuring unbiased jurors.
Although the Court's opinion was
only nine pages, the drafting Justices quoted or cited to Tanner no less than
eleven times. 97 There are primarily two major faults with the Court's
reasoning in Tanner and Shauers: first, an over-reliance on efficacy preverdict measures to prevent a biased jury; and second, using overly
restrictive precautionary measures to prevent an overly-hyped fear at the

90 Shauers, 135 S. Ct at 529.

91 See id. (providing that evidence of bias still available to be brought to the court's attention
after voir dire).

See id. at 524-30 (reasoning the Court's application of Rule 606(b)).
Id. at 529; see also FED. R. EVID. 606.
94 See id. at 529
95 See Shauers, 135 S. Ct. at 525-30 (holding 606(b) applies when jurors lie during voir dire,
affidavit inadmissible, and constitutional avoidance inapplicable).
92

93

96

Id. at 523.

97 See generally id. at 521-30

(citing Tanner).
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costs of litigants' constitutional rights. 98

The Court believes that existing measures to prevent juror bias are
sufficient to satisfy the requirements of an unbiased jury for the Sixth
Amendment, and they include: voir dire; the ability of the court and
counsel to observe jurors during trial; the ability of jurors to report
misconduct before rendering a verdict; and the ability to impeach a verdict
with non-juror evidence of misconduct. 99 The problem, however, is that
there is considerable evidence which suggests fault with that reasoning.1i°
While those measures are necessary and effective to reveal bias and
impartiality, they are by no means always successful. 10 1 The Court is
correct in saying they do not have to provide a "perfect" jury, or remove all
possible bias, which is a logistical nightmare, but they should acknowledge
that jurors with substantial, material biases and prejudices are able to
successfully get on a jury. 10 2 Modem research suggests that even if
confronted during voir dire, a juror may not admit to a bias or prejudice
because they are either not consciously aware of bias, or are too
embarrassed to admit it publically or to another person.103 Despite postvoir dire safety measures, a jury may still use faulty reasoning and
evidence outside the permitted scope of the law: "while the jury can
contribute nothing of value so far as the law is concerned, it has infinite
capacity for mischief, for twelve men can easily misunderstand more law in
a minute than the judge can explain in an hour. 104 A broader interpretation
to the exceptions in Rule 606(b)(2) would act as an addition safeguard to
prevent an impartial verdict caused by a prejudice that was able to slip

98 See Tanner, 483 U.S. at 120 ("Allegations of juror misconduct, incompetency, or
inattentiveness, raised for the first time days, weeks, or months after the verdict, seriously disrupt
the finality of the process."); Shauers, 135 S.Ct. at 525-26 (holding 606(b) to be plain meaning);
Crump, supra note 38, at 510 ("Tanner v. United States is a fascinating illustration of the
ambiguous policies, unresolved conflicts, and potential for anomalous outcomes concealed in the
ostensibly clear language of the evidentiary rule that excluded ... testimony.").
99See Tanner, 483 U.S. at 127 (enumerating protections against juror bias).
100See Crump, supra note38, at 510 ("Tanner v. United States is a fascinating illustration of
the ambiguous policies, unresolved conflicts, and potential for anomalous outcomes concealed in
the ostensibly clear language of the evidentiary rule that excluded ...testimony.").
101See id. at 524-25 (discussing measures to reduce biases).
102

See Amanda Wolin, What Happens in the Jury Room Stays in the Jury Room ... but

Should It?: A Conflict Between the Sixth Amendment and FederalRule of Evidence 606(b), 60

UCLA L. REv. 262, 264 (2012) ("Voir dire, however, may not uncover a juror's bias or
prejudice, and, therefore, a biased or prejudiced juror may sit and render a verdict, thus depriving
the defendant of his constitutional right to an impartial jury.").
103 See id. at 286-87 (discussing research on juror bias and prejudice).
104 See Skidmore v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 167 F.2d 54, 60 (2d Cir. 1948) (arguing issues
with leaving jury completely alone to render verdict, leading to confusion and error).
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through voir dire.'0 5
Furthermore, in both Tanner and Shauers, the Court greatly

expressed their fear that a more inclusive 606(b) would wreak havoc on the
courts, but with virtually no evidence or solid reasoning to support that

fear. 10 6 This fear is not without its merits or completely unreasonable, but
it chooses to ignore many of the realities in which Rule 606(b) exists. The
Supreme Court's reliance on jurors to come forward with any issues of
prejudice or bias during the trial seems to be putting too much faith on the
average person who may not know what is appropriate and what is not
appropriate. 07 A myriad of rules exist to regulate the type, manner,
relevance of every piece of evidence, and testimony throughout the trial
because jurors are not deemed competent to know themselves; by that logic
then, they are no more qualified to know what is appropriate in
deliberations than in the courtroom.'0 8

The Supreme Court also expressed a fear that expanding 606(b)(2)
would compromise the total secrecy of jury deliberations and that "[j]urors
will not be able to function effectively if their deliberations are to be
scrutinized in post-trial litigation. " 10 9 While the Court repeatedly states that
it wishes to preserve the privacy and secrecy of juror deliberations, they
overlook the fact that Rule 606(b) only applies jurors testifying: it does not
bar any juror from discussing deliberations outside of the courtroom, as
they often talk to their friends and family, and for high-profile cases, some
even publish tell-all books and conduct lengthy television interviews. 110 For

105

See Schwarzer, supra note 44, at 576-77(providing suggestions for improving jury trials,

notably not being bound fear of change).
106 See Tanner, 483 U.S. at 120 ("Allegations of juror misconduct, incompetency, or
inattentiveness, raised for the first time days, weeks, or months after the verdict, seriously disrupt
the finality of the process."); see also Shauers, 135 S. Ct. at 525-26 (holding 606(b) to be plain
meaning).
107 See Rank, supra note 7, at 1421-22 ("An irony of the jury system in the United States is
that jurors considered at the same time omniscient and incompetent. They are deemed incapable
of weighing the difference between "admissible" and "inadmissible" evidence, but considered
sufficiently responsible and autonomous to mete out justice with little review of the rationale
behind their decisions.").
108 See Baltimore & O.R. Co., 167 F.2d at 57-59 ("Yet no amount of brave talk can do away
with the fact that, when a jury returns an ordinary general verdict, it usually has the power utterly
to ignore what the judge instructs it concerning the substantive legal rules, a power which,
because generally it cannot be controlled, is indistinguishable for all practical purposes, from a
'right'.").
109 See Tanner, 483 U.S. at 124 (discussing potential issues of expanding 606(b)).
110 See HAZEL THORNTON ET AL., HUNG JURY: THE DIARY OF A MENENDEZ JUROR (1995)
(detailing Thornton's time as juror in infamous 1993 trial of Lyle and Erik Menkez); MICHAEL
KNOX & BRIAN E.MiKE WALKER, THE PRIVATE DIARY OF AN O.J. JUROR (1995) (revealing
Knox's private thoughts throughout trial O.J. and how other jurors affected verdict in
deliberations); AMANDA COOLEY, CARRIE BESS, & MARSHA RUBIN-JACKSON, MADAM
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example, after George Zimmerman was acquitted in the shooting of
Trayvon Martin, CNN's Anderson Cooper conducted a lengthy interview
of juror B37, in which she discussed her opinion of nearly every aspect of
the case, as well as the mentality and rationale of several otherjurors.111 In
one juror's self-published book, he mentioned that in order to test the
defendant's alleged intoxication levels when driving, he drank three vodka
drinks before the jury deliberations to see the impact. 112 Not only did this
result in the defendant getting a new trial, directly contradictory to
Tanner's belief, but DeMartin was charged with indirect criminal
contempt." 3 Finally, the Court's fear seems to ignore the history of juror
testimony: Mansfield and the less restrictive Iowa Rule existed for
centuries before the establishment of Rule 606(b), and yet, the court
systems have still managed to operate and function efficiently
and the
1 14
nation has yet to collapse into lawless disorder and chaos.
The Court should not only concern itself with the hypothetical
consequences juror testimony would have on jury autonomy and secrecy,
but rather, the impact a severely limited interpretation of Rule 606(b)(2) is
actively having now on the lower courts and their litigants." 5 The Sixth

FOREMAN: A RUSH TO JUDGMENT? (1996) (consisting of complaints and thoughts of multiple
jurors in the O.J. Simpson trial); GREG BERATLIS ET AL., WE, THE JURY: DECIDING THE SCOTT
PETERSON CASE

Peterson);

(2007) (surmising thoughts and deliberations of seven jurors in the trial of Scott

DENNIS DEMARTIN, BELIEVING IN THE TRUTH

(2012) (detailing DeMartin's thoughts

and rationale of vehicular manslaughter case).
III Dana Ford, George Zimmerman Was 'Justified' in Shooting Trayvon Martin, Juror Says,
CNN,
Mar.
30,
2015,
http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/16/us/zimmennanjuror/http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/16/us/zimmerman-juror/ (containing juror B37 video and
what impacted her thoughts and other jurors during trial).
112 See DEMARTIN, supra note 110 (detailing DeMartin' s thoughts and rationale of vehicular
manslaughter case; Marc Freeman, Judge Upgrades Contempt Charge for Ex-Goodman Juror,
SUN SENTINEL, May 30, 2013, http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2013-05-30/news/fl-dennisdemartin-contempt-hearing-20130530_1_goodman-case-drinking-experiment-john-goodman
(discussing impact of DeMartin's statements in his book).
113 See Freeman supra note 112 ("DeMartin, 70, returned to face a charge of indirect
criminal contempt.").
114See discussion supra Section II (discussing Iowa Rule and Mansfield history).
115 See Henley, 238 F.3d at 1120 ("Racial prejudice is plainly a mental bias that is unrelated
to any specific issue that a juror in a criminal case may legitimately be called upon to determine.
It would seem, therefore, to be consistent with the text of the rule, as well as with the broad goal
of eliminating racial prejudice from the judicial system, to hold that evidence of racial bias is
generally not subject to Rule 606(b)'s prohibitions against juror testimony."); Villar, 586 F.3d at
84 (holding Rule 606(b) prevents further juror inquiry regarding comments during deliberation).
115 See Henley, 238 F.3d at 1120 ("Racial prejudice is plainly a mental bias that is unrelated
to any specific issue that a juror in a criminal case may legitimately be called upon to determine.
It would seem, therefore, to be consistent with the text of the rule, as well as with the broad goal
of eliminating racial prejudice from the judicial system, to hold that evidence of racial bias is
generally not subject to Rule 606(b)'s prohibitions against juror testimony."); Villar, 586 F.3d at
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Amendment guarantees every defendant in a criminal trial the right to be
tried by an impartial jury. 11 6 The Court in Shauers found not only that a
juror's bias and deception during voir dire did not apply to Rule

606(b)(2)(A), but also that it was constitutional because "[a] juror's bias
can certainly be considered 'extraneous prejudicial information' since it is
a particular fact or circumstance (information) outside of the evidence
presented to the jury (extraneous) concerning an unfavorable preconceived
opinion or feeling (prejudicial).""7 While some circuit courts have similar
logic to Shauers in denying testimony of juror bias under Rule 606(b)," 181
many courts have found that it does not apply to bias, and grant juror
testimony as a preservation of the Sixth Amendment, especially in regards
to racial bias." 9 Not only does a biased juror undermine the validity of the
verdict, "the deliberation room may be the only place in which to ascertain

a juror's true bias or prejudice", making the other jurors uniquely qualified
to be the best, if not the only, source of evidence. 120 In spite of this, the
Court in Shauers still clings to the notion that if juror misconduct is not
identified prior to deliberation, the misconduct is not admissible.' 2'

84 (holding Rule 606(b) prevents further juror inquiry regarding comments during deliberation).
116

See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362 (1966) (discussing media impact on jury);

Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946) (finding juror competence to be
individual matter, not class or group); Bennett L. Gershman Contaminating the Verdict: The
Problem of Juror Misconduct, 50 S.D. L. REV. 322, 334 (2005) (explaining Sixth Amendment
guarantees defendant unbiased jury in criminal cases); see also Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589,
594-95 (1976) (discussing minimum requirements and expectations determining bias of juror).
117 See Wolin, supra note 102, at 289 (describing first two exceptions of Rule 606(b)).
118 See United States v. Benally, 546 F.3d 1230, 1241 (10th Cir. 2008) (holding that Sixth
Amendment does not require exception for racial bias testimony).
119 See United States v. Henley, 238 F.3d 1111, 1120 (9th Cir. 2001) ("Racial prejudice is
plainly a mental bias that is unrelated to any specific issue that a juror in a criminal case may
legitimately be called upon to determine. It would seem, therefore, to be consistent with the text
of the rule, as well as with the broad goal of eliminating racial prejudice from the judicial system,
to hold that evidence of racial bias is generally not subject to Rule 606(b)'s prohibitions against
juror testimony."); United States v. Villar, 586 F.3d 76, 84 (2009) (holding Rule 606(b) prevents
further juror inquiry regarding comments during deliberation).
120 See Wolin, supra note 102, at 281 (describing juror testimony is important where
bias is
alleged after the verdict); see also Colin Miller, Dismissedwith Prejudice: Why Application of the
Anti-Jury Impeachment Rule to Allegations ofRacial, Religious, or Other Bias Violates the Right
to Present a Defense, 61 BAYLOR L. REV. 872, 925 (2009) (elaborating that juror testimony is
often only evidence of juror misconduct or bias).
121 See Shauers, 135 S. Ct. at 523-30 ("Whether a juror would have been struck from the jury
because of incompetence or bias, the mere fact that a juror would have been struck does not make
admissible evidence regarding that juror's conduct and statements during deliberations.").
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C. Need for Reform
One of the most harmful consequences of limiting a juror's ability
to testify is that they are frequently the only ones who witness juror
misconduct and often only come forward once the trial is over. 122 The
Supreme Court, however, has repeatedly argued that purely preventive
measures are sufficient, despite court officers, judges, attorneys, and other
jurors repeated failures to identify a bias or outside influence prior to juror
deliberations. 123 This is particularly concerning because most data suggests
that influences outside of trial are going to be more prevalent with the
growing access and use of smartphones and social media; so much so, that
it has given birth to the term "Google mistrial." 24 Over the past two
decades, there has been an increasing trend for jurors to conduct their own
research on the internet, rather than rely solely on evidence presented

122

See Henley, 238 F.3d at 1120 ("Racial prejudice is plainly a mental bias that is unrelated

to any specific issue that a juror in a criminal case may legitimately be called upon to determine.
It would seem, therefore, to be consistent with the text of the rule, as well as with the broad goal
of eliminating racial prejudice from the judicial system, to hold that evidence of racial bias is
generally not subject to Rule 606(b)'s prohibitions against juror testimony."); Villar, 586 F.3d at
84 (holding Rule 606(b) prevents further juror inquiry regarding comments during deliberation);
see also Wright v. Illinois & Mississippi Tel. Co., 20 Iowa 195, 211-12 (1866) (discussing juror's
knowledge); State v. Cherry, 341 Ark. 924, 931-33 (2000) (granting new trial only because
allegations were paired with juror testimony and accounts); Huebner, supra note 44, at 1469-71
(discussing impact of Tanner while also offering alternative methods to maintaining effective
trials). Considering precedent set by Lord Mansfield, the court in Wright said:
At all events the superior opportunities of knowledge and less liability to mistake,
which the juror has over the spy, would entitle his statement to the most credit. And
if, as is universally conceded, it is the fact of improper practice, which avoids the
verdict, there is no reason why a court should close its ears to the evidence of it
from one class of persons, while it will hear it from another class, which stands in
no more enviable light and is certainly no more entitled to credit.
Wright, 20 Iowa at 211-12 (emphasis in original).
123

See Henley, 238 F.3d at 1120 ("Racial prejudice is plainly a mental bias that is unrelated

to any specific issue that a juror in a criminal case may legitimately be called upon to determine.
It would seem, therefore, to be consistent with the text of the rule, as well as with the broad goal
of eliminating racial prejudice from the judicial system, to hold that evidence of racial bias is
generally not subject to Rule 606(b)'s prohibitions against juror testimony."); Villar, 586 F.3d at
84 (holding Rule 606(b) prevents further juror inquiry regarding comments during deliberation);
Wolin, supra note 102, at 281 (describing juror testimony is important where bias is alleged after
the verdict); Miller, supra note 120, at 925 (elaborating that juror testimony is often only
evidence of juror misconduct or bias).
124 See John Schwartz, As Jurors Turn to the Web, Mistrials Are Popping Up, N.Y. TIMES,
March 17, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/18/us/18juries.html?em&_r-O (explaining
Google mistrial and impact on modem trials).
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during the trial, which often goes undetected by the Court itself' 125 For
example, take the recent murder trial in New York for Dr. Robert
Neulander, who quickly gained media attention after being accused of
murdering his wife.126 Dr. Neulander was ultimately found guilty, but
before the sentencing hearing, an alternate juror came forward to tell court
officers that Juror 12 had been fervently texting during the course of the
trial and during breaks. 127 Juror 12 ultimately admitted that she had been
texting during the trial, and when just chosen to sit on the jury she texted
her father about the high profile case, who texted back "Lucky you, make
sure he's guilty."'2 8 Further investigation revealed that Juror 12 had sent
approximately 7,000 text messages during the three week trial, none of29
which had been observed or reported by anyone associated with the trial. 1
This is by no means an isolated incident, and what is perhaps most
concerning is that courts are failing to properly block jurors from outside
information and most jurors do not realize it was improper or inappropriate
until after the trial. 30 One juror in the United Kingdom was taking part in
a child abduction and sex abuse case, and during the trial she conducted a

125 See Thaddeus Hoffmeister, Google, Gadgets, and Guilt: JurorMisconduct in the Digital

Age, 83 U. COLO.L. REv. 409, 417-19 (2012) (discussing impact mobile technology is having on
jurors and concerns for today's courtrooms).
126 See Sarahbeth Ackerman, Juror admits to deleting text messages sent throughout
Neulander trial, CNY CENTRAL, July 8, 2015, http://cnycentral.com/news/local/juror-admits-todeleting-text-messages-sent-throughout-neulander-trial?id-1227680 (covering Neulander's trial
and scandal of juror caught texting); Douglass Dowtry, Dr. Robert Neulander deniednew murder
trial in wife's death; sentencing Thursday, SYRACUSE.COM, July 27, 2015 7:54 PM)
http://www. syracuse.com/crime/index. ssf/2015/07/dr-neulander murder trialjury_misconduct.h
tml (reporting impact of Juror's texting on trial and detail about amount of texting).
127 See Downy, supra note 126 (reporting impact of Juror's texting on trial and detail about
amount of texting); Ackerman, supra note 126 (describing text received by Juror 12 from father
saying "Lucky you, make sure he's guilty[.]").
128 See Ackerman, supra note 126 (describing text received by Juror 12 from father saying
"Lucky you, make sure he's guilty[.]").
129 See id; see also Dowtry, supra note126. While the texting was rather extensive and
discussed sensitive material pertaining to the trial, the judge presiding over the case found that the
messages alone did not warrant a new trial, and Dr. Neulander was found guilty of murder and
evidence tampering. See Dowtry, supra note 126 (reporting on Dr. Neulander's murder case).
130 See John Leyden, Juror dismissed over Facebook poll, THE REGISTER, Nov. 26, 2008,
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2008/11/26/facebook trialpoll/ (reporting instance in which U.K.
juror made Facebook poll about the verdict); Douglas L. Keene & Rita R. Handrich, Online and
Wiredfor Justice: Why Jurors Turn to the Internet (the "Googlemistrial'),THE JURY EXPERT,
Nov. 2009, http://www.thejuryexpert.com/2009/11/online-and-wired-for-justice-why-jurors-turnto-the-internet-the-google-mistrial/ (detailing trend of juror's doing online research and difficulty
of court's preventing them); Brian Sharpe, Twelve Angry Iphone Users, 23 DCBA Brief 46, 47
(2010) (discussing how ingrained smartphones and social media is with jurors and challenges
therein).
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poll on Facebook to ask people to vote on her verdict.' 3 ' When questioned
about why she created the poll, the juror did not think it was improper and
simply replied that she was unsure about her verdict, and thought an online
poll would be helpful. 32 Often times, it may not simply just be one rogue
juror-in 2009, a Florida federal judge had to declare a mistrial after it was
discovered that at least nine of the jurors had been researching the case on
their smartphones throughout the entire trial, which went unnoticed for a
surprising amount of time.' 3 3 Juror testimony can be invaluable, because
while many jurors may not intentionally research the case on their own,
they are highly susceptible to updates, links, tweets, and posts from dozens
of internet sources that could influence their decisions, whether that was
their intent or not, and courts are repeatedly proving to be ill-equipped to
prevent this before deliberations. 34
Besides the impeding complications with social media and digital
influences on jurors, the Supreme Court should adopt a less strict
interpretation of Rule 606(b) and develop clearer methods for allowing
juror testimony to alleviate the confusion and inconsistency in lower
courts.'35 While the Schauers opinion was consistent with the ruling in
Tanner, it failed to clarify any of Tanner's uncertainty that has resulted in
wildly different applications of Rule 606(b) depending on the district. 136
When dealing with extraneous information, some courts say "a rebuttable
presumption of prejudice arises, "i37 others have ruled that through
,1i38
particular influences an "irrebuttable presumption of prejudice arises,
while other courts view the prejudice of outside influences on a case-by-

131
132

See Leyden, supra note 130 (explaining juror's conduct).
See Leyden supra note 130. The Facebook post was titled "I don't know which way to

go, so I'm holding a poll." Id.
133 See Bill Haltom, Twelve Angry Tweeters, Tenn. B.J. 40, 40 (2009) (discussing social
media during jury deliberations and impact on jury).
134 See Schwartz, supra note 124 (detailing issues of smartphones in the juror box); sources
cited supra note 130 (discussing issues with internet access and jurors).
135 See Rank, supra note 7, at 1421 (outlining issues such as too much faith in jurors and
concerns of limited oversight).
131 See Part III. B (discussing Shaurers); see alsoVictor James Gold, 27 FED.Practice and
Procedure § 6075 (2nd. ed. 2015) (compiling information on inconsistencies and different
definitions of 606(b) and exceptions).
137 See, e.g., Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229 (1954) (establishing burden to
rebut presumption of influence is government's burden); United States v. Lawson, 677 F.3d 629,

644-46 (4th Cir. 2012) (finding a presumption of influence on juror who researched case terms
through online database); United States v. Vasquez-Ruiz, 502 F.3d 700, 701 (7th Cir. 2007)
(concluding juror getting message "GUILTY" in her notebook created presumption of prejudice).
138 See United States v. Greer, 620 F.2d 1383, 1385 (10th Cir. 1980) (concluding outside
influence found after verdict, its "presumption of prejudice cannot be overcome.").
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case basis. 3 9 It may be impossible to create a single effective, clear rule
when it comes to permitting jurors to testify about what was discussed
during deliberation, which is perhaps why it may be best to give some
discretion to the presiding trial or appellate judge. 140 In contrast, one of the
objectives of physics is to establish a theory of everything, or an "ultimate
theory" in which everything in the universe would abide by one eloquent
theory or framework.'14 This has proven impossible thus far, however,
because quantum mechanics does not abide by the same principles as the
rest of universe, essentially, a theory that may operate well in the grand
scheme of things falls apart when applied to the extremely specific; so too
is the application of juror testimony and Rule 606(b). 4 2 Even if the
Supreme Court did not take such a conservative approach to their
interpretation of 606(b), it may be best to give greater discretion to the
lower courts, as an all-encompassing interpretation of 606(b) may work on
a grand scale, but deny a constitutionally qualified and unbiased jury to a
few specific litigants. 43
Also, the Supreme Court has failed to
acknowledge that Rule 606(b) and Tanner are not millennial-long legal
principles, and have only been in existence for a fraction of the history of
juror testimony procedures. 44 In fact, just two decades before Rule 606(b)
was created, in Remmer v. United States145 the Supreme Court was much
more lenient towards claims of jurors who were affected by outside
influences, and were hesitant to create a nation-wide standard when they

See Gold, supra note 136, at § 6075 (discussing approaches by other courts); see
generally United States v. Boylan, 898 F.2d 230, 261 (1st Cir. 1990) (stating presumption if
"egregious tampering or third party communication which ... injects itself into the jury
process."); Hard v. Burlington N. R.R., 812 F.2d 482, 485 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding burden to
prove outside influence was prejudicial and rested with the defendant, not government),
abrogatedby Warger v. Shauers, 135 S. Ct. 521 (2014); State v. Stafford, 678 P.2d 644, 647
(Mont. 1984) (deciding outside influences were not prejudicial and put burden upon plaintiff to
prove otherwise).
139

140 See Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire Peremptory
Challenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 233 (1989) ("Just as the

jury system provides a safeguard against the excesses, insensitivities, and biases of judges, judges
should check the excesses, insensitivities, and biases of jurors. Bringing the distinct perspectives
of jurors and professional judges to bear on an issue promotes greater confidence in its resolution
than yielding the decision to either lay or professional judges alone.").
141

See

STEVEN WEINBERG, DREAMS OF A FINAL THEORY: THE SCIENTIST'S SEARCH FOR

3-14 (1994) (detailing evolution and framework from which
physicists have tried to create unifying theory).
142 See id. (detailing evolution and framework from which physicists have tried to create
THE ULTIMATE LAWS OF NATURE

unifying theory).
143

Id.

144

See Rank, supra note 7, at 1425 (providing overview of American common law

development of rule 606(b)); supra Part II (discussing history of Iowa Rule and MansfieldRule).
145 347 U.S. 227 (1954).
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ruled in McDonald.146 That is, in part, what makes the Court's strict
standards in Shaurers ultimately so frustrating: "In McDonald, the
Supreme Court 'recognize[d] that it would not be safe to lay down any
inflexible [anti-jury impeachment] rule because there might be instances in
which such testimony of the juror could not be excluded without violating
the plainest principles ofjustice.147
IV. CONCLUSION
Justice comes not from the verdict rendered by the jury, but the
means by which they come to that verdict. Having such a strict
interpretation of the already narrow exceptions to Rule 606(b) prevents
legitimate inquiries into the validity of a verdict. There is admittedly,
however, the potential for abuse when juror testimony is made less
restrictive, but it could be greatly diminished by practical safeguards. An
attorney could become aware of a conflict or outside influence during the
trial, but choose to wait until the verdict is rendered to decide to make a
motion for a new trial, or perhaps be so egregious as to intentionally add a
juror during deliberations as an ace in the hole to overturn an unfavorable
verdict. A reasonableness test could be implemented that bars juror
misconduct that the attorney was aware of, or reasonably should have been
aware of, or that would have been revealed during traditional voir dire and
juror instruction. While a broad rule, it would require the attorney and
court officers to be vigilant throughout the trial, but permit testimony on
unforeseeable outside influences and juror deception during voir dire.
Also, it is worth noting that these suggestions in no way guarantee a new
trial, nor is that their intention: even with multiple jurors testifying to
alleged misconduct, a judge may reasonably conclude that the misbehavior
is not sufficient to warrant a new trial. The objective here is to simply
permit the opportunity for a party to effectively present their case before an
impartial jury. It would be in the best interest if the Supreme Court
mirrored its earlier decisions in the early twentieth century and gave greater
discretion to the lower courts. Rule 606(b) and its rules will still remain in
effect, obviously, but the greatest problem and criticism come not from the
language of the Rule, but the Court's interpretation of that language, which
they alone have the power to correct. While the fears and concerns
expressed by the majority in Tanner and Shauers are legitimate, the Court
146

See generally Remmer, 347 U.S. at 229 (establishing burden to rebut presumption of

influence is government's burden); supra Part II (discussing McDonald).
147 See Miller, supra note 120, at 942; see also Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 11421 (1987) (discussing McDonald).
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prevents them by bringing into effect an overly restrictive interpretation of
Rule 606(b), and for the reasons previously mentioned, further litigation
and court decisions should lean towards a more liberal interpretation to
allow every litigant access to an unbiased jury as the Constitution demands.
DavidK Kouroyen Jr.

